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he thought of Friedrich Nietzsche has been called
anti-anti-naturalistic. It is not mere naturalism,
nor is Nietzsche's body of work simply aligned
with the reaction against naturalism. While a tacit
admiration for such figures, such "strong, independent spir
its" as Plato and Kant (Kant the paradigmatic anti
naturalist, Plato a more difficult case) is surely present,
Nietzsche's desire to make something new in and of the his
tory of philosophy led him to roundly criticize their ilk. A
conscious rhetorical distancing, from either of two given
forces within history, and central to Nietzsche. The problem
of nature and naturalism is the paradox of a dual imma
nence, of culture in nature and nature in culture. The
'sourcing' of the one into the other is, alternately, natural
ism and antinaturalism; nature as giving the rule to culture,
or culture apart from nature and in many ways governing it
indeed. Nietzsche is inclined to read a false antinomy into
this distinction thus revealing in his reading of nature his
prototypical methodology.
Edward Abbey, 20th century heir to Thoreau, enjoys a
Nietzschean encounter with the two "natures II aforemen
tioned in his Desert Solitaire. The book's lyricism and read
ability has rendered it ripe for cooption by those disinclined
to read the philosophy out of the prose, establishing a firm
bond with both Thoreau and Nietzsche. For these writers
style is substance, in this they stand out in the history of
philosophy. Both Nietzsche and Abbey, on whom I will
focus always mean what they say, though deciding exactly
what it is they are saying is a task of great difficulty, and of
a very different kind from that found in the case of Kant or
Hegel. The Nietzschean methodological move mentioned
above is one I wish to read into Abbey, and its implications,
one I see as arising explicitly out of the anti-anti-naturalistic
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stance.
Early in Desert Solitaire, Abbey states his anti-anti
naturalistic intentions:
Like a god, like an ogre? The personification of the
natural is exactly the tendency I wish to suppress in
myself, to eliminate for good. I am here not only to
evade for a while the clamor and filth and confu
sion of the cultural apparatus but also to confront,
immediately and directly if it's possible, the bare
bones of existence, the elemental and fundamental,
the bedrock which sustains us. I want to be able to
look at and into a juniper tree, a piece of quartz, a
vulture, a spider, and see it as it is in itself, devoid
of all humanly ascribed qualities, anti-Kantian,
even the categories of scientific description. To
meet God or Medusa face to face, even if it means
risking everything human in myself. I dream of a
hard and brutal mysticism in which the naked self
merges with a nonhuman world and yet somehow
survives intact, individual, separate. Paradox and
bedrock. iii
The Nietzschean tension of the dual immanence of nature is
here palpablei the desire of the subject to merge with nature
(the world, Other) and still maintain itE? own integrity, its
self-intelligability. Is this, though a paradox, possible? The
advantages of both are obvious, and Nietzsche (and Abbey
after him) seems to be asking, in his particular way, can we
not have both?
Nietzsche's method would seem to say, 'perhaps.'
Not in a concrete manner, however, for part and parcel of
Nietzsche's method is the critique of "the doer behind the
deed," ensuring that I'The form is fluid, but the 'meaning' is
even more SO."iv This conjoined with his assertion that
...purposes or utilities are only signs that a will to
power has become master of something less power
ful and imposed upon it the character of a functioni
and the entire history of a "thing/' an organ, a cus
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tom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of
ever new interpretations and adaptations whose
causes do not even have to be related to one an
other but, on the contrary, in some cases succeed
and alternate with one another in a purely chance
fashion. v

results in a picture of understanding (and meaning)-in-the
world. This 'resolution' of the anti-anti-naturalistic paradox
seems to create another antinomy that unlike the dialectical
Kantian antinomy, is held up vibrating with conflict into
. the air, a sort of totem. The problem of nature's dual imma
nence becomes analogous to, if not largely equivalent with,
the problem of meaning, interpretation, and truth. Truth in
the old sense, a static 'form' behind the world (whether that
be nature or culture) is something Nietzsche, as is obvious,
discards. He still speaks of 'truth,' though in a manner
similar to his use of the word meaning.
That is, the fluid sign-chain of interpretation that is a
given subject'S moment in history can be adapted in ways
that are not all created equal. I-Ie condemns a tendency he
sees in II modern historiographYi" 1I ... it rejects all teleology; it
no longer wishes to 'prove' anything; it disdains to play the
judge and considers this a sign of good taste ... "vi All this
would seem to arise necessarily out of the aforementioned,
and Nietzsche admits to this in the same breath he critiques
it. Nietzsche writes that the will to power in man "would
rather will nothingness than not will. "vii AIld concludes the
Genealogy with an assertion that "Man, the bravest of ani
mals and the one most accustomed to suffering, does not
repudiate suffering as such; he desires it, he even seeks it
out, provided he is shown a l1/eaning for it- a purpose of suf
fering,"viii Thus a necessity of meaning is, paradoxically,
injected into the picture of an always already interpreted,
lirelativistic," world. What demands this meaning (Den'ida:
"coherence in contradiction expresses the force of a de
sire."ix) is the will, and it is the will to power by which it can
be measured, evaluated, interpreted.
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The discussion of suffering above arises in the con
text of remarks on the adoption of ascetic ideals as man's
best option to date, this after sixty pages of criticism.
Adoption of the ascetic ideal is a case of willing nothing
ness, rather than facing the alternative. There is, for
Nietzsche, a better option. In Beyond Good and Evil he
writes:
To translate man back into nature; to become mas
ter over the many vain and overly enthusiastic in
terpretations and connotations that have so far
been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic
text of homo natura; to see to it that man henceforth
stands before man as even today, hardened in the
discip line of science, he stands before the rest of
nature, with intrepid Oedipus eyes and sealed
Odysseus ears, deaf to the siren songs of old meta
physical bird catchers who have been piping at him
all too long, 'you are more, you are higher, you are
of a different origin!' - that may
a strange and
insane task, but it is a task - who would deny that?
Why did we choose this insane task? Or, putting it
differently: 'why have knowledge at all?'x
It, the interpretation for meaning, becomes at once the as
sumption of the most (best?) insane question a'nd its most
rigorous and conunitted actualization. Committed, again
in the sense that "there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting,
becoming... /,xi gives a dynamic picture of interpretation.
Perhaps to reach the ideal of the elimination of the doer,
and to in turn embody that ideal to the point that it drops
away, one must suffer through this insane task. Here the
desert may be necessary.
All this is inextricably bound up with the paradoxi
cal II nature II of nature, as described by Abbey. It arises out
of the problematic situation that is being-in-the-world.
Nietzsche and Abbey share a proclivity, a desire, to point
out that the task of "translatin.g man back into nahne" is as
necessary as it is insane. Abbey writes "A civilization which
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destroys what little remains of the wild, the spare, the origi
nal, is cutting itself off from its origins and betraying the
principle of civilization itself."xii It moves to eliminate suf
fering, and the desert. What this principle is, I will come to
momentarily and it will surely and again be shot through
with paradox. Perhaps this, this problem of the dual imma
nence of nature, this source of paradox, is the original
"riddle of the sphinx."
The desire for' coherence in contradiction,' for mean
ing in interpretation, for b:uth in becoming, is pulled out of
the dual immanence of nature. Humans are in nature, "in
all her ·prodigal and indifferent magnificence which is out
rageous but noble."xiii That is, in something vast and with
out purpose. It is human desire, will to power, the IInature"
in man that obliges, forces with violence the interpretation
with an intent that results in coherence, both within a sub
ject and between subjects. This invariably does violence to
the unordered 'order,' what Nietzsche called 'the primor
dial unity,' that is mere being-in-the-world. However, this
"mere II is not sufficient, it does not satisfy the demand of
the will to power, does not allow for the meaningful, mean
ing creating discharge of the will to power.xiv This violence
is inevitable. Nietzsche writes:
Consider any morality with this in mind: what
there is in it of 'nature' teaches hatred of the laisser
aller, of any all-to-great freedom, and implants the
need for limited horizons and the nearest task
teaching the narrowing of our perspective, and
thus in a certain sense stupidity, as a condition of
life and growth. xv
This self-limiting, self-imposed adoption of
'morality/ of an ideal, is the necessary and agonistic resolu
tion of the dual immanence of nature. The violence it does
to the subject'S relation to the world is an inevitability, the
concern only that it is taken through fully and with com
mitment. Nietzsche writes:
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"You shall obey - someone and for a long time: else
you will perish and lose the last respect for your
self" this appears to me to be the moral impera
tive of nature which, to be sure, is neither
"categorical" as the old Kant would have it (hence
the "else") nor addressed to the individual (what do
indivduals matter to her?), but to peoples, races,
ages, classes - but above all to the whole human
animal, to man.xvi
This demand, instantiated by nature through culture (and
nature's immanence in culture), creates in the conditions of
the meaningful existence of humanity, and therefore hu
man existence as such, a paradox. One that cannot be es
caped.
This paradox is inherent in existence as such because
it gives man the power to interpret, to create meaning; it
gives the will to power. As Nietzsche writes:
In man creature and creator are united: in man there
is material, fragment, excess, clay, dirt, nonsense,
chaos; but in man there is also creator, formgiver,
hammer hardness, spectator divinity, and seventh
day: do you understand this contrast?xvli
If the creative potential in man is the only way of defining
himself, the only interpreter, and this only comes out of a
conscious turning away from his immanence in nature,
then the paradoxical circle is complete. Humanity's Inean
ing, existence, is founded on a turning away from that is at
the same time a turning towards. The promise of meaning
that is the primordial unity is merely a promise; humanity
must, in this case, create their own promises in action. TILey
must desertify, go into the desert that is heartless, that is a
brick-walled riddle, thereby escaping a society which in
variably enforces the old modes of meaning-creation. Enl
bracing suffering as meaning, either physically or in. the
ll1ind, is the desert. It is only subsumed in paradox, within

DESERTIFICATION AND METAPHYSICS

the desert, that meaning and interpretation, a new meta
physics, begins. Though the desert is always something to
be eventually left, or forgotten.
When, in the Genealogy, Nietzsche mentions desert, it
is briefly. A quarter of the way through his treatment of
ascetic ideals in the Third Essay, he writes of the value of
ascetic ideals for the IIfree spirit," that they provide motiva
tion to" ...all those resolute men who one day said No to all
servitude and went into some desert: even supposing they
were merely strong asses and quite the reverse of a strong
spirit./l xv iii Nietzsche does not deny that this strength of
mind, of will, is valuable and something to be admired,
even if the direction of that will, its reason, is misguided.
This relates strongly to Nietzsche's stance on ascetic idealsi
he does not condemn them as such, they represent what to
date has been the best option for humanity, the best method
for the 'insane task.' The deselt, as mentioned in the epi
graph, need not even be a place. It is in Nietzsche a place
£01' and of the consciousness, 'heartless,' where "no actor of
the spirit could possibly endure li£e./I xix
Abbey has certainly been painted as just such a
strong ass. His book illustrates that the difference between
being an ass and a spirit is exceedingly fine. As Abbey
writes, "there is a way of being wrong which is also neces
sarily right."xx What this is for Nietzsche, as regards ascetic
ideals, is that the cooption of such ideals is as aforemen
tioned not necessarily negative, though the dominant ideals
of the modern age most certainly are. It is the purity and
strength of these ideals' initial presentation, such as in the
Old Testament where the desert looms large, that Nietzsche
finds so appealing. It is the perversion of these ideals that
he finds so odious, and therein lies his condemnation of
Plato, Christianity, and lithe Germans." It is echoed in Ab
bey's condemnation of contemporary industrialism: "This is
a courageous view, admirable in its simplicity and power,
and with the weight of all modern history behind it. It is
also quite insane. I cannot attempt to deal with it here."xxi
Indeed. And in much the same way as Nietzsche
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does not critique Kant on Kantls own terms, impenetrable
task that it was constructed to be, Abbey does not engage
with his object of ire in its own realm. He retreats, literally,
to the desert, using it like Thoreau did as a symbolic cata
lyst towards the state Nietzsche described as a desert. Ab
bey's "isolation" was as profound as Thoreauls; the latter
was often seen galumphing across the fields to the Emer
sonls on hearing the dinner bell. However, Abbey's reflec
tions on the desert parallel Nietzschels, in a way that re
flects the latter's ultimate criticism of ascetic ideals. Just as
Abbey's conclusion that the desert has no heart, that "its
surface is also the essence"xxii results in a different view of
truth implicit in the ceasing to be of any quest,so too does
Nietzsche see in the externalizing tendencies of the ascetic
ideal a violation, a tacit Idoerl tacked onto the deed.
Nietzsche writes "All honor to the ascetic ideal insofar as it is
honest! so long as it believes in itself and does not play
tricks on us!" Abbey calls the industrial ideal !courageous l
for this reason; it has a profound faith in itself and the ends
it pursues. Despite this, there are reasons to reject it. Simi
larly with Abbey's quest to 'understand the desert;' as long
as he looks for a 'meaning' or 'truth' behind what he is
standing in, Abbey fails to 'see' the meaning of most value:
the one that views each moment as itself the meaning. This
in turn reveals the infinite chain of meaningsj
interpretations present in-the-world.
Nietzsche sees an ascetic journey, whether actual or
psychic, as at base false. It extrapolates an exterior
'meaning' from being-in-the-world, which is invariably a
kind of trick. Just as Abbey!s creation of a desert in his
mind distracted him and alienated him from the desert he
was standing in, so too do ascetic ideals isolates m.an from
his own life. In this way, Abbey's initial asceticism in Desert
Solitaire can be seen as similar to that of industrialism. The
ascetic move must be overcome, and perhaps the desertify
ing move through asceticism is the only way to found such
a new metaphysics of immediacy.
But can this occur? Can this return to bedrock really,
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as Abbey dreams, resolve the paradox of the dual inlma
nence of nature? Will it allow the subject to become self
identical with the world at large? This last bit of rhetoric
demonstrates how quickly absurdity is here reached. It
must be remembered that, as Abbey writes, lithe desert is
also a-tonal, cruel, clear, inhuman, neither romantic nor
classical, motionless and emotionless, at one and the same
time - another paradox - both agonized and deeply still."xxiii
The desert is irreducible and irresolvable, a paradigm of
nature as it is faced by culture, by man. It may be that in
Nietzsche the origin of the nature/ culture bifurcation,
which for Derridaxxiv among others is foundational to phi
losophy as we have known it, begins when this base para
dox is denied, when simplification and unneeded consoli
dation occur- in one direction or another. This casts.
Nietzsche's moral critique in a very foundational light, one
which (paradoxically) admits that at the deepest level of
critique is the simplest of maxims. Not mere laisser aller,
but a self-ordered relevance within the world that is sim
pler because it is sensical, sensible in the generic valence.
Philosophy, after all, can be simpJe, and. never easy. Like
the desert.
.
This is reflected in the works under considera tion.
Both Nietzsche and Abbey were brilliant stylists, and Be
yond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, and Desert
Solitaire represent the apex of their mutual attempts to em
body their philosophies within their literary efforts. Much
has been made of how both authors contradict themselves
often, and how this lends itself to oversimplified misinter
pretation by those readers not as exacting as Nietzsche him
self called for. There are profound differences between the
two, Nietzsche far outreaches Abbey as a thinker (or mis
sionary), while the genres in which they were working
makes a literary comparison facile and pointless. Most im
portant are tl1e intersections, their stances concerning na
ture as detailed above, and the variegated paradox it dic
tated, as one commentator has noted, applies to Nietzsche
as much as Abbey:
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The polyphonic voice of Desert Solitaire makes it
difficult for opponents to identify and attack the
center out of which Abbey's discourse flows; the
multiple voices help defuse the resistance of the.
skeptical reader...Because Abbey's celebratory tone
bonds...to an ironic one which acknowledges the
problematic status of a reverent attitude in the
postmodern world, the book becomes an alloy of
distin.ctive strength. xxv
The so-called 'multiple voices' of both Abbey and
Nietzsche are not separate devices after the fashion of
Kierkegaard, but rather a manifestation of the enormous
breadth of these two writers. They are, to paraphrase Whit
man, 'vast, and contain multitudes.' This, the enormous,
contradictory nature of which both Abbey and Nietzsche
sees themselves as immanent in, is the source of this
"postmodern," decentered method of speaking so central to
both. Morris is correct in seeing this as a great strength.
This is what is most 'basic' to Nietzschean metaphys
ics, a critiqued metaphysics etched by blown sand, from the
desert that is man's strength, his move through suffering to
meaning-in-the.-world. The ability to see, to move as Abbey
did outside the culture that created him and take up some
thing that, while it is likely harder, is also surely better. As
Nietzsche wrote in the Nachlass, "I also speak of a 'return to
nature' although it is not actually a 'return back,' but an
'advance towards' the strong, bright, frightful nature and
naturalness of men who can play with great tasks, because
they would become tired with small ones and feel dis
gusted."xxvi The conscious move into the desert is, as it was
for Abbey, a move chasing an abstract and therefore false
ideal which in the end brings about the dissolution of such
ideals by virtue of the sheer harsh force brought to bear on
the subject. The desert, in Abbey and Nietzsche, is a purify
ing place, cutting being-in-the-world down to just that, for
its own sake.
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